This paper examines a Cournot game where capacity constraints are determined in an auction prior to the market interaction. Traditional auctions may not generate a profit-maximizing allocation of capacity in this case, a failure that is traced to the presence of externalities in the valuations. The modification of Ausubel & Milgrom (2002) 's generalized ascending proxy auction developed in Ranger (2004) is shown to lead to an efficient allocation. It is efficient and strategically simple for the bidding firms. Furthermore, the auction is designed to allow the explicit inclusion of auctioneer preferences in calculating the final allocation. Unlike in standard auctions, consumer surplus considerations can thus be incorporated in a straightforward manner.
Introduction
Over the last decade or so, multiple-unit auctions have become important tools both for the government and private sector firms in markets where the number of participants is small and price-taking assumptions therefore do not hold. While the sale of government assets, such as mobile phone frequency spectrum, has received most public attentiondue surely to the sheer size of these transactions -, auctions are also commonly used for government procurement and business-to-business sales. In many cases, the participants in these auctions are firms and the items for sale are not for final consumption but are inputs in a production process.
This has an important consequence for the valuation of objects. If the participants of an auction compete in the same final goods markets, its outcome may affect the nature of post-auction competition through the resulting allocation of inputs. Both winners and firms not obtaining any items are interested not only in which items they win, but also in what their competitors win as the value of a particular set of inputs may depend on the identities of all winners and their respective bundles. Thus, firms have an interest in the overall allocation of goods and each winner imposes an externality, positive or negative, on all other firms.
While the presence of externalities in an auction might at first seem slightly overly theoretical and perhaps of little practical interest, Moldovanu & Ewerhart (2001) , for example, recount that mobile phone operators in the recent European spectrum auctions attempted to minimize the total number of firms winning licenses. In particular, each new firm winning the right to operate a mobile phone network was thought to reduce the profit for the firms already in the market by more than a competing incumbent winning an additional license. As a consequence the existing incumbents tried to prevent the success of potential entrants.
The effects of externalities in valuations was first explored in a series of articles by Phillippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu and Ennio Stacchetti 1 . They find that bidders may have an incentive to pay the auctioneer not to sell an item -an outcome not possible under most traditional auction mechanisms -, or make the strategic decision not to participate in the auction. Such a commitment might prevent a competitor from bidding aggressively, winning and imposing an externality on the non-participating bidder. Even if credible, however, non-participation may not lead to an efficient outcome of an auction. More generally, unless externalities are symmetric (Das Varma 2002) , efficiency cannot be guaranteed (Aseff & Chade 2002 , Cornet & Laan 2001 , Brocas 2002 . Allowing bidders to collude in order to internalize the effects they impose on each other does not remedy the problem (Caillaud & Jehiel 1998) . Ausubel & Milgrom (2002) propose an auction mechanism that allows bidders to express bids on bundles of goods rather than forcing them to bid on items separately, thereby taking account of non-additive valuations. Furthermore, they suggest a generalization in which bidders report preferences over outcomes of the auction in a way similar to Bernheim & Whinston (1986) 's menu auction. 2 Unlike the first-price static auction of Bernheim & Whinston (1986) , however, computerized proxies bid on behalf of each bidder in an ascending price auction. The resulting allocations are shown to be stable with payoffs in the core of the auction game.
If the outcomes of the generalized ascending price auction are defined as complete allocations of items to bidders, Ausubel & Milgrom (2002) 's framework can be adapted to the case of externalities. Bids on bundles of goods are then contingent on the winning allocation, bidders can fully express valuations and the generalized ascending price auction terminates in its core with respect to reported valuations. Moreover, under certain conditions, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which bidders report their valuations truthfully to the proxy agent.
So far, valuations have been treated as exogenous and the properties of various auctions in the presence of externalities has been the exclusive focus of analysis. The aim of this paper is thus twofold. First it attempts to incorporate the generalized multipleunit auction of Ausubel & Milgrom (2002) into a more general market game. In the first stage of the game, capacity is auctioned to a number of firms who will compete with each other in a second-stage final-goods market. Competition in the market game determines valuations for allocations in the auction, while the capacity won by each firm constrains their second-stage output decisions. Furthermore, alternative assumptions about the auction mechanism will be shown to affect the nature of competiton in the final-goods market.
Secondly, the paper shows how the auctioneer's preferences can included explicitly in obtaining the final allocation of the general ascending proxy auction. This has important implications. Since the efficiency property of an auction is generally defined with respect to its participants, whenever the outcome of the auction affects non-participants, such as the consumers in an oligopolistic market, any 'efficient auction' is unlikely to maximise overall surplus. Recognising this fact, governments have tended to include bidding and participation rules in order to stimulate competition in the final goods market. Although these rules influence the final allocation by restricting bidding behaviour, they may not be as transparent and obvious in their motivation as clearly stated auctioneer preferences and may be denounced as ad hoc by losing bidders.
The first part of the paper, section 2.1, describes the Cournot game played by firms in the second period where output is limited by a capacity constraint. This constraint is the outcome of an auction run prior to the market interaction. The generalized ascending proxy auction is introduced in section 2.2. Unlike traditional auctions, it will lead to a capacity allocation that is efficient with respect to the valuations of both the firms and the auctioneer. Section 3 proposes two sets of valuations for the auctioneer that seem particularly intuitive and briefly examines their consequence on bidding strategies. It will be shown that for a wide class of auctioneer preferences, bidding behaviour is unchanged. Section 4 concludes.
The Cournot Auction Game
Suppose there exists a market in which N = {1, . . . , N } firms potentially compete with each other. In the first stage of the game, each firm takes part in an auction for productive capacity. Although not necessary for the subsequent analysis, it is convenient to assume that firms do not own any capacity prior to the auction, so that the vector of capacity k = {k n } n∈N resulting from the auction acts as a constraint on secondstage production. For simplicity, firms are assumed to engage in quantity (Cournot) competition in the final goods market. The analysis is standard.
Stage 2: The Cournot Game
Each firm, n, can produce perfectly divisible output, q n , up to the firm-specific capacity constraint, k n , at a cost of C n (q n ). All output is assumed to be homogeneous and is sold at a market price, P (Q), determined by the combined output of all firms, Q = N q n . Both the inverse demand function P (Q) and the individual cost functions C n (q n ) are common knowledge. Firms simultaneously make their output decision q n ≤ k n , production takes place and all output is sold. Profit v n for each firm is thus a function of its own output decision and the combined output of its competitors Q −n = m∈N \n q m :
Each firm maximises its profit given the output of its competitors and the capacity constraint. The resulting reaction function q * n (Q −n ) is obtained from the first order condition of the constrained profit maximization. Lemma 1. Given the combined output of its competitors Q −n , firm n's reaction function q * n (Q −n , k n ) is given by q * n (Q −n , k n ) = min {q n , k n } whereq n solvesq n :
The Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game is found as the intersection of all firms' reaction functions. It can be described by the first order conditions of each firm's profit maximizing exercise.
Lemma 2. The constrained Cournot Nash equilibrium output levels q * (k) = {q * n } n∈N (k) are determined by the following conditions:
whereq n solves
The unconstrained Cournot Nash equilibrium is given by q * n =q n . The following assumptions guarantee that a finite q * exists and that it is indeed a maximum. While common in the analysis of Cournot games, it is not necessarily obvious that they would hold in practice.
Assumption. Market demand P (Q) and the individual cost functions C n (q n ) are continuous and characterised by the following properties.
A1.2 Concave demand:
It is a well known result that the unconstrained Cournot Nash eqilibrium is unlikely to maximise efficiency measured as the combined profit of all firms. By lowering the market price, an increase in the production of any firm lowers the profit of all other firms. Profit maximising firms do not account for this negative externality when making their output decision and therefore produce above the efficient level. For any coalition of firms L ⊆ N there exist an output vector q L which maximizes the combined profit of this coalition, the coalition-efficient output level. Due to the externality, coalitionefficiency involves fixing the output for both members and non-members. Ignoring capacity constraints, coalition efficiency is defined as follows.
Definition (Coalition-efficient output). For any coalition L ⊆ N the coalitionefficient (L-efficient) output q L is the vector of output levels {q m } m∈N that maximizes combined coalitional profit.
Lemma 3. The coalition-efficient output levels {q L n } n∈N are determined by the following first order conditions:
Comparing the first-order conditions for the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium with the coalition-efficient outcome (equations (2) and (4)) shows that any coalition of firms with more than a single member would like to reduce output relative to the Cournot outcome. The following propositions further characterise the coalition-efficient output.
Then assumptions A1.1 to A1.3 and Lemma 3 would require that for each firm n ∈ L q L n ≥ q L i , generating a contradiction.
Proposition 2. Unless costs are linear, for any two coalitions L and L such that
Proof. The proof is again by contradition. Suppose that there exists a firm i ∈ L for which q L i < q L i . Then, by assumption A1.3 and ruling out linear cost functions,
But this is impossible as Proposition 1 has shown.
Thus adding firms to a coalition will increase its coalition-efficient output and reduce the production and profits of each member of the smaller initial coalition unless costs are linear. With linear costs, the coalition-efficient output is invariant with coalition size and any division of production between its members is equivalent from the coalition perspective. 3 In both cases, the average profit for members of the initial coalition falls.
Of course, coalition-efficient output levels are not an equilibrium of the unconstrained Cournot market game. Firms which are not members of the coalition and would therefore be required not to produce at all clearly have an incentive to increase output. Furthermore, in the absence of binding contracts members of the coalition, too, would profit from raising production. 4 As a consequence not even a coalition of size |N | can achieve efficiency without some external commitment mechanism.
The capacity auction in the first stage of the game can act as such a commitment mechanism. By determining the capacity for each firm, it effectively imposes a constraint upon output in the market game. Potentially at least, firms could thus use the firstperiod auction to allocate capacity in a way such that the constrained Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game would be equivalent to some coalition-efficient outcome. The following analysis shows that with any traditional auction where the bidder with the higest valuation obtains an object such hopes are unfounded.
Suppose the total capacity available for sale is equal to the unconstrained Cournot output. Since there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies with aggregate output greater than Cournot output, this assumption ensures that no exogenous capacity limit influences the results.
Assumption. The total level of capacity available in the first-round auction K is weakly higher than the combined unconstrained Nash equilibrium output of the Cournot game:
In order for any coalition of size smaller than |N | to attain efficiency it has to be able to withhold capacity from all non-members. Since total capacity available exceeds the efficient level of any size coalition, this would require a coalition to win more than required for efficiency and commit itself not to exceed efficient production in the second period. Credibility issues and collective property rights aside, this is not possible. The combined loss to any coalition from the initiation of production by a non-member is lower than the benefit of producing to the latter. Therefore, no coalition can profitably prevent production by a non-member.
Proof. From equation (1) and Lemma 3, the change in profit from an incremental increase in production for firm m at q L m is
The loss for coalition L is
From assumption [A1.3] and the first order condition equation (4) it follows that
Moreover, the following proposition shows that the gain to any firm from increasing production at the efficient level is greater than the loss to any other single firm. That is, no single firm can profitably prevent an expansion of production by any other member of the coalition -at least not without itself raising production. This is true for coalitions of all size.
Proposition 4. At the vector of coalition-efficient output levels q L ,
Proof. From equation (1),
The loss to a firm n ∈ N \i is obtained from the same equation,
The proof then follows from the first-order condition equation (4).
As a consequence, a traditional auction in the first period of the game cannot induce an allocation of capacity that would guarantee efficient output levels in the second period market game. This is the result of the particular nature of the externalities in the Cournot game and the limitations of traditional auction mechanims. Since firms have an incentive to raise output beyond the efficient level, in order for production to be limited, the aucioneer would have to retain some capacity. A voluntary commitment by firms not to bid for this capacity is not credible. Rather, bidders would have to pay the auctioneer not to sell, an outcome not possible in traditional auctions, as Jehiel et al. (1999) observe.
Moreover, even if the auctioneer could be paid not to sell a certain number of units, Proposition 4 shows that no single bidder could do so profitably. Although an increase in production by a firm reduces aggregate profits, the fall in profit for any individual firm is smaller than the increase in profit of the deviating firm at the efficient level of output. In order to outbid a firm wishing to acquire additional capacity, its competitor would have to pay a price exceeding the loss it would sustain were the capacity sold. Since traditional auctions do not allow bidders to bid jointly -on the auctioneer not selling, in this case -they generally cannot lead to efficient capacity constraints for the Cournot game.
This inability of traditional auctions to lead to efficiency can be traced to a constraint on communication between bidders and the auctioneer in traditional auctions. Since each unit of capacity sold to a firm -up to its optimal output given by Lemma 1 -allows it to increase production in the second period, each unit sold also reduces the profits of all other firms. Unless bidders are able to communicate the magnitude of this externality to the auctioneer, it lacks the information necessary to find the efficient allocation. Stated slightly differently, while firms' valuations are in terms of the capacity allocation to all firms, they can only communicate the value of capacity they win.
Allowing bidders to express externalities by making bids on capacity contingent on the entire allocation of capacity overcomes this shortcoming. First, firms can quantify the value of unused capacity, either retained by the auctioneer or allocated to bidders whose capacity constraint is already non-binding. And second, by combining the externalities reported by all firms through their bids, the auctioneer can find the efficient allocation. Ausubel & Milgrom (2002) 's generalised ascending proxy auction, a dynamic generalization of Bernheim & Whinston (1986) 's menu auction, can be used to this end. The follwing section outlines the auction mechanism briefly. A more detailed description of the auction in the context of externalities can be found in Ranger (2004) .
Stage 1: The Generalized Ascending Proxy Auction
The generalized ascending proxy auction due to Ausubel & Milgrom (2002) allows firms to place bids on entire allocations rather than simply units of capacity. It is therefore directly concerned with the final allocation of capacity, with bidders being able to influence the units allocated to their competitors as well as to themselves. This has a further implication. Since bidders can directly bid on the levels of capacity to all other participants in the auction, participation may be profitable even to agents that are not interested in winning capacity themselves. A bidder representing consumer interests, for example, could try to bid in a way that would slacken the capacity constraints for the second-period market game.
Taking allocations as the primitive of the auction also allows the inclusion of seller preferences in the winner determination. Rather than use bidding and participation rules that could be critisized as ad hoc by losing bidders, the auctioneer can thus explicitly achieve an objective other than pure revenue maximization. This may be particularly attractive for governments who -due to consumer surplus considerations -are interested in fostering competition in final goods markets and the more direct approach of inviting consumer representatives to bid is not practical. The generalized ascending proxy auction can be described as a mechanism in which bidders in subsequent rounds suggest an allocation together with a payment to the auctioneer who selects its profit maximising allocation. The auction ends when no bidder is making a further proposal. 5 All firms N = {1, . . . , N } participate in the auction. Denote the auctioneer by n = 0. Then, an allocation of capacity can be defined as a vector, k, which assigns to each participant, including the auctioneer, a level of capacity k i .
Definition. An allocation k is a vector of capacity constraints k = {k 0 , k 1 , . . . , k N } such that
where K is the predetermined level of total capacity available. Let K be the set of all possible allocations.
The value of a particular allocation k to a firm n can be found by combining its profit function from the market game (equation (1)) with all firms' optimal output decisions constrained by the capacity constraint k as derived from Lemma 1. Unlike the profit function in a standard auction, it is defined over the set of all allocations K: v n = {v n (k), ∀k ∈ K}. Since firms are not required to produce up to the capacity constraints in the second period and final output is assumed to be homogeneous, the valuations for different allocations may be the same.
Definition. The value v n (k) to firm n of an allocation k ∈ K is given by
The value for the auctioneer is v 0 (k).
At the beginning of the auction, each bidder submits a vector of values to a computerised proxy that will bid in a predetermined way on its behalf. 6 Let b t n (k) denote the bid placed by bidder n's proxy in round t on assignment k. The auctioneer then selects a provisionally winning assignment k * t which maximizes its own payoffs. This payoff includes the valuation of the auctioneer and the sum of the submitted bids. 7 5 For a detailed description of the more general auction mechanims see Ausubel & Milgrom (2002) . Ranger (2004) applies the auction to the special case where bids are on allocations.
6 Using a proxy has two main advantages. First, it speeds up the auction as the interaction of the proxy with the auction algorithm makes communication between the auctioneer and the bidders after each round redundant. Secondly, since the bidding behaviour of the proxy is known, it shifts strategic considerations to the beginning of the auction, thereby potentially reducing the scope for mistakes.
7 Not specifying v0(k) in terms of second-period output allows the auctioneer have more general preferences.
In each round, the payoff a bidder obtains from a particular allcocation is given by the value this allocation provides in the second period and the bid placed,π t n (k) = v n (k) − b t n (k). The maximum payoff bidder n can achieve in round t is then
The computerized proxy is programmed to bid straightforwardly (myopic bidding) relative to the values give by the firms. That is, the proxy raises the bid on those allocations that achieve the maximum payoff for its bidder unless they were provisionally winning allocations in the previous round. In other words,
and is the minimum bid increment in the auction.
The auction ends in round T + 1 when no new bids are placed and the provisionally winning assignment becomes final, k * T = k * . Each bidder pays the auctioneer the final bid, b T n (k * ). While straightforward bidding by the proxy restricts the price path of the auction, bidders can influence the point at which their proxy stops bidding through their value reports. A particularly simple strategy is for a firm i to require the proxy to demand at least a profit target π n by shading the maximum bids uniformly. This semi-sincere bidding strategy involves submitting valuationsṽ n (k) = max {0, v n (k) −π n }. Ausubel & Milgrom (2002) have shown that bidders always have a semi-sincere best response, that is, the analysis of the auction can be restricted to semi-sincere strategies without loss of generality. If bidders report semi-sincerely, the auction terminates at an allocation that generates the highest profits in the second-stage constrained Cournot game consistent with the auctioneer's preferences.
Proposition 5. At T the auctioneer chooses a capacity allocation that maximizes the combined payoffs of all firms and the auctioneer.
And its payoff is
The first line of the argument is the auctioneer's payoff maximization problem. The proposition then follows from the straightforward bidding of the proxies and semisincere reporting.
Moreover, at T no coalition of firms can offer an allocation-bid combination to the auctioneer that would improve the payoffs of all of its members weakly and for at least one of them strongly and that would be accepted by the auctioneer. In other words, the outcome of the auction is stable and its associated payoffs are in the core of the auction game, core(N, V ) where
Proposition 6. The capacity auction terminates at a payoff vector π T that is in the core with respect to the reported valuations.
Proof. Suppose the auction does not lead to the core payoffs. Then there exists a coalition of firms L which can achieve higher payoffs for itself and the auctioneer.
The first inequality follows from the definition of a blocking coalition, the second line from Proposition 5. Some re-arranging and the fact that bids are weakly positive and the auctioneer does not place any bids lead to the contradiction.
Proposition 6 limits the payoff a firm can achieve in the auction. Since final payoffs have to be in the core, no reporting strategy can lead to a payoff that exceeds the highest payoff compatible with the core constraints. Otherwise, there would be a coalition of firms that can block the outcome by making new bids which would raise both their own and the auctioneer's payoffs. Since the point at which the auction terminates depends on the amount π n by which each bidder n shades its true valuations, a link between the highest bidder payoffs and Nash equilibrium in semi-sincere strategies can now be established.
Definition (Bidder-optimal payoff ). A vector of payoffs in the core of the auction game, π ∈ core(N, V ), is bidder-(Pareto-)optimal if there is no other payoff vector, π , such that π ∈ core(N, V ), π = π and π i ≥ π i for every bidder i.
Proposition 7. Let π be a bidder optimal point in the core. Then, there exists a Nash equilibrium supporting π with equilibrium strategiesṽ n (k) = max{0, v n (k) − π n }. Furthermore, if the auction game has a Nash equilibrium with semi-sincere strategies, its payoffs are bidder optimal.
Proof. See Ranger (2004) for detailed proof.
This result is stronger than it might appear at first. Despite the presence of externalities, the generalized ascending proxy auction posesses a Nash equilibrium that is both efficient and relatively simple from a strategic point of view. Unlike in traditional auctions, by reporting their valuations semi-truthfully firms can bid on capacity constraints that reflect the externalitites cause by increased production in the second period. Together with the ability of the auctioneer to express its own valuations this permits the mechanism to find a value-maximizing capacity allocation.
Furthermore, the auction offers firms the highest overall payoffs that are compatible with the auctioneer's preferences and a stable capacity allocation. The link between the Nash equilibrium in semi-sincere strategies and bidder optimality is intuitive. At a bidder-optimal point in the core no bidder can demand higher profits without reducing the payoffs to at least one opponent. Since this opponent demands its own bidderoptimal payoff, however, this is not possible. 9 Although bidder-optimality cannot be linked to a single pessimal payoff for the auctioneer, it is clear that since the maximum value of the capacity allocations is fixed bidder and seller optimality are mutually exclusive.
Although semi-sincere bidding is strategically simple, the informational requirements are non-trivial. In order for firms to find a bidder optimal core payoff, knowledge of the auctioneer's and all other firms' value functions are required. Transparency and an imposed non-strategic behavior of the auctioneer suggest that the auctioneer's value function be published before the auction. Furthermore, firms might be able to arrive at good estimates of each others' value functions. The demand function in the second period is identical for each firm and assumed to be common knowledge, so that the only uncertainty arises from different cost functions. Since the firms operate in the same market, they might have relatively precise ideas about inter-firm cost differences and can approximate the resulting value functions, making it possible to estimate each others' value function with some precision.
A more serious problem, perhaps, is the possible multiplicity of bidder-optimal core points and the resulting multiplicity of Nash equilibria in semi-sincere strategies. Coordinating on a particular equilibrium strategy then involves both cooperation of the firms against the auctioneer to terminate at a bidder-optimal payoff and competition over which of them to select. The auction mechanism does not give an a priori answer to what is essentially the outcome of a bargaining game between the firms over the surplus from the auction. This problem obviously disappears when the bidder-optimal core point is unique. Ausubel & Milgrom (2002) have shown that the bidder-optimal core payoff is unique if and only if the vector of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payoffs is contained in the core. In that case the two coincide. 10
Definition. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payoff, π V CG n , for firm i is given by
where q N \O is the N-optimal output level in the Cournot game defined by Lemma 3.
Although the presence of VCG-payoffs in the core ensures the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in semi-sincere strategies in the generalized ascending proxy auction it is not sufficient to support a Nash equilibrium with truthful revelation of valuations. Only if the auction terminates at the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payoffs when bidders submit their valuations truthfully to the proxies do they not have an incentive to shade their bids. Ausubel & Milgrom (2002) identify a technical condition on bidder vaulations, buyer-submodularity, for this to be the case. Buyer submodularity requires the increase in combined coalitional profits from adding another firm to the coalition to decline in the size of the origianal coalition.
Definition (Buyer submodularity). Valuations are buyer submodular if for all
If the valuations are buyer submodular, truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium strategy in the generalized ascending proxy auction leading to Vickrey payoffs for every bidder.
Proof. See Ausubel & Milgrom (2002) .
If truthful reporting of valuations guarantees the firms their VCG payoffs and therefore the largest payoffs they can hope to achieve in the core of the auction game, both the strategic and informational requirement of the mechanism are much simplified. It should be noted that -although the auctioneer is not a buyer in the auction -its valuations affect the final allocation and the prices paid by the firms and therefore have to be included in the buyer-submodularity argument.
Auctioneer Preferences and Vickrey Payoffs
While the valuations for the firms are derived from the second-period constrained Cournot game, no restrictions have so far been placed on the auctioneer's preferences over capacity allocations. In the following papragraphs some plausible assumptions about the objective of the auctioneer will be made and their effect on the outcome of the auction will examined.
Pure Revenue Maximization
A purely revenue maximizing auctioneer is indifferent among the final capacity allocations and selects the final allocation that maximizes the combined bids by all firms. In this case, v 0 (k) = 0 for all k ∈ K and the provisionally winning capacity allocation after round t is found by
The following results characterize the outcome of the generalized ascending proxy auction.
Proposition 9. If the auctioneer is indifferent between allocations, v 0 (k) = 0 for all k ∈ K, all coalitionally stable pure strategy Nash equilibria of the generalized ascending proxy auction result in the N-efficient capacity level, k * T = q N .
Proof. Suppose the auction ends at a capacity vectork = q N . Then, by the definition of N-efficiency,
Therefore there exists a coalition W of firms for which
The coalition W has a profitable deviation that would lead the auction to terminate at k * T = q N which furthermore does not require transfers between the members of the coalition.
More importantly, the following proposition establishes the link between truthful reporting and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payoffs when the auctioneer is indifferent between allocations.
Proposition 10. If the auctioneer is indifferent between allocations, v 0 (k) = 0 for all k ∈ K, truthful reporting of valuations v n (k) by all bidders, n ∈ N \0 is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof proceeds by showing that the valuations derived from the Cournot game are buyer-submodular. First, define an arbitrary coalition M ⊂ N such that 0 ∈ M and a firm n ∈ N \M . Then the maximum profit the coalition of M and n can achieve, given firm n's output q n is max qm,∈N \n
and let q M (q n ) be the maximizing argument. Clearly q M (q n ) is a function of q n . Furthermore, q M m (q n ) = 0 for all m / ∈ M . Using the definition of buyer submodularity and q M (q m ) from equation (7), the valuations from the Cournot game are buyer submodular if, for all 0 ∈ L ⊂ L,
where q L∪n and q L ∪n is the coalition efficient output for firm n as a member of coalition L and L , respectively. The concavity of the demand function and the fact that L q L (q n ) ≤ L q L (q n ) for each q n guarantee that the integrand in the second line of equation (8) exceeds the one in the first. Furthermore, by Proposition 2, q L∪n ≤ q L ∪n . Since both the definition of submodularity and equation (7) involve maximization of combined profits the capacity constraint must be binding and the above argument translates to valuation expressed in capacity vectors. The Cournot market game induces valuations that are bidder submodular.
The buyer submodularity property of firms' valuations is a direct result of the propoerties of the demand and cost functions. Adding a firm to an existing coalition raises total coalitional output while reducing optimal production levels for each individual firm. This, in turn, reduces both the market price obtained by the firms as well as their cost of production, resulting in higher combined profits. If the firm is added to a larger coalition, however, the fall in the price caused by the increase in production is larger due to the concavity of the demand function. Furthermore, since firm's production levels decline in coalition size, the convexity of the cost function diminishes the reduction in costs from lower firm output for larger coalitions, as firms are operating in the flatter portion of their cost function. As a consequence the benefit of incorporating a firm into a coalition declines in its original size, making valuations buyer submodular.
The generalized ascending proxy auction therefore posesses a Nash equilibrium in which bidders submit their valuations truthfully when the auctioneer is purely interested in maximizing its profits. While pure profit maximization is likely to be a reasonable assumption about the auctioneer's motivation in many cases, a government auctioneer might have additional aims. This is particularly the case when the increase in firm payoffs from the auction come at the expense of the consumers in the final goods market as in the Cournot setup of the second period market. If consumers are unable to participate directly in the auction -as is likely to be true in general -the auctioneer can counterbalance firms' interests through the choice of its preferences over allocations. In particluar, the auctioneer might attempt to maximize total surplus from the auction.
Consumer Surplus Maximization
In contrast to a social planner's perspective on maximizing total surplus achievable given demand P (Q) and the cost functions C i (q i ), the auctioneer has to consider that firms cannot be forced to produce output above their profit-maximizing level in the second-period market game. A sophisticated auctioneer should be assumed to include this limitation in the calculation of its valuations. Hence, in the Cournot auction game, the definition of total surplus for a given capacity vector has to be constructed by including each firm's reaction function to a given capacity vector into the standard definition. Moreover, since firm surplus is already accounted through their bidding behaviour, the auctioneer's valuations should only represent consumer surplus in order to avoid a double-counting of profits. The valuations for the auctioneer that attempts to represent the interests of the consumers in the second-period market are defined as follows.
Definition (Consumer Surplus Valuations). Feasible consumer surplus valuations,
where q * i (k) is the constrained Cournot Nash Equilibrium output level defined in Lemma 2.
Definition (Total Feasible Surplus). Total feasible surplus in the Cournot auction game as a function of the capacity allocation k is given by
Then, the sum of the auctioneer's and all firms' valuations are equal total feasible surplus,
Proposition 11. If the auctioneer has consumer surplus valuations, any Nash equilibrium in semi-sincere strategies of the generalized ascending proxy auction maximizes total feasible surplus.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 2, equation 11 and the fact that the auctioneer cannot force firms to produe more than their optimal level q * i (k).
It is possible to describe the final capacity allocation of the auction more precisely.
Proposition 12. The minimal capacity level at which the generalized ascending proxy auction terminates when the auctioneer maximizes consumer surplus is the unconstrained Cournot output level q * n for all firms n ∈ N .
Proof. The auction terminates at the capacity allocation k * which maximizes total feasible surplus,
By the first order conditions this is true for k * such that, for all n ∈ N ,
Equation 13 is satisfied in two cases.
1.
∂qn ∂kn | k * = 0: This holds for all k * ≥ q * .
2.
By the definition of q * this cannot be true for any k * < q * .
The intuition behind this result is as follows. At the (N \0)-optimal capacity vector no firm can outbid all of its competitors for additional capacity and output in the second period is constrained. By subsidizing each firm's bids for higher capacity levels, the auctioneer can profitably relax the second period constraints and raise overall output in the constrained Cournot game. Maximizing the sum of all submitted bids and the auctioneer's valuations in each round of the auction acts as such a subsidy. Once k reaches the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium output levels, however, the firms' capacity constraint is no longer binding and additional units of capital will not raise equilibrium production in the market game, even though total surplus would increase. The inability of the auctioneer to achieve total surplus maximization is then due to its inability to subsidize production, instead of capacity in the set-up of this game.
The strategic properties of the generalized ascending proxy auction are again related to the valuations of the participants. In particular, buyer-submodularity will lead to the existence of a Nash equilibrium with truthful reporting of valuations. The intuition is similar to the case of the revenue-maximizing auctioneer. 11 Proposition 13. If the auctioneer has consumer surplus valuations, truthful reporting of valuations v n (k) by all bidders, n ∈ N \0 is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof proceeds as in the case where the auctioneer is indifferent (Proposition 10). For a given coalition M , define the following levels of output. Let q * M m (q n ) be the unconstrained Cournot Nash equilibrium output for members in M , given firm n's output q n . Furthermore, define q * M m as the unconstrained Nash equilibrium output of a firm m given by Lemma 2 when only firms in M are producing. Then, buyer submodualarity holds if, for all 0 ∈ L ⊂ L,
n the inequality holds.
11 It should be noted that the strategic considerations only apply to the bidders. The auctioneer is assumed to report its valuations truthfully, even though this is unlikely to be revenue maxmizing.
The reporting of auctioneer preferences that seek to maximize consumer surplus do thus not affect the strategic properties of the generalized ascending proxy auction. Truthful reporting leads to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payoff vector, and bidders have no strategy that would provide them with a higher core payoff. This result, together with the buyer-submodularity of the values for a pure profit-maximizing auctioneer, allows a further generalization. For any valuations reported by the auctioneer that are proportional to consumer surplus, there exists a Nash equilibrium with truthful reporting of bidder valuations.
there exists a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with truthful reporting by all bidders i ∈ N \0.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that the sum of two submodular functions is itself submodular, and from Propositions 13 and 10.
In other words, as long as the auctioneer maximizes the weighted sum of revenue and consumer surplus, its preferences do not affect bidding strategies for the firms. Governments are therefore able to choose an optimal tradeoff between consumer surplus maximization and raising of revenue without having to consider the strategic implications for bidding behaviour. 12 It can be argued that since the generalized ascending proxy auction leads to the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium in the second period market game, its is an unneccessary complication over a traditional auction that would generate exactly the same output levels, prices and consumer surplus. While this is true, there is a crucial difference between the two mechanims. If there is enough capacity being auctioned to allow firms to produce Cournot output levels in the second period there would not be excess demand for capacity in the auction and reveneues for the auctioneer would be minimal. With the generalized ascending proxy auction, the auctioneer subsidizes aggregate capacity levels, but firms still have to compete over the division of capacity among each other. A a consequence, revenue for the auctioneer is higher and part of the firm's gains from restricting output is in effect appropriated by the (government) auctioneer.
Summary and Conclusion
Externalities in valuations can lead to inefficient allocations with many traditional auctions for two main reasons. First, if bidding is restricted to naming prices for items, bidders are unable to express their valuations fully, that is they lack the means to communicate to the auctioneer the externalities other bidders may impose on them. As a consequence, the auctioneer does not have sufficient information to compute the efficient allocation. Moreover, bidders cannot subsidise each other's bids in order to prevent an undesirable outcome or influence the allocation of units they do not win themselves.
Secondly, even if the auctioneer posesses information about the externalities, as long as prices are defined over goods, the final allocation-price pair might not be stable in the sense that at the given prices bidders might prefer a different bundle. This paper combines a constrained Cournot market game with an auction for capacity to illustrate the failure of standard auctions to generate a profit-maximizing capacity allocation for the firms. Rather than relying on ad hoc assumptions about externalities, valuations are constructed from the profits firms can earn in the market game following the auction. Firms' profits are linked to each other's output decisions through the price of a homogeneous product, and capacity constraints can be used to limit ouput levels. Since individual reductions in profit from the expansion of output by another firm are smaller than the increase in profit for the expanding firm, it is not profitable to buy capacity solely in order to prevent increases in production. That is firms bidding for units of capacity cannot prevent output to reach the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium level even though this is clearly inefficient from their perspective.
By defining bids over entire allocations instead of units of capacity, the generalized ascending proxy auction allows coalitions of firms to prevent each other from obtaining capacity in excess of the combined profit maximizing level. Furthermore, at the final price-allocation pair no coalition of firms can suggest a different price-allocation combination that would be acceptable to the auctioneer. 13 The auction also allows the auctioneer to include its own preferences explicitly in determining the final allocation. Consumer surplus considerations can thus be expressed. Since firms cannot be forced to produce in excess of the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium levels, the total surplus maximizing output levels cannot be attained, however. The auctioneer can merely relax the capacity constraints for firms to increase production to their Cournot output. In contrast to standard auctions which may lead to the same outcome, the auctioneer can appropriate some of the second period profits from the firms.
Optimal bidding strategies in the context of the Cournot game are straightforward. If the auctioneer is purely revenue maximizing or if its valuations reflect consumer surplus considerations, the generalized ascending proxy auction has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies where bidders submit their valuations truthfully to the proxy bidding on their behalf. Even when truthful reporting is not a Nash equilibrium, there are equilibria where bidders shade their respective valuations uniformly.
